

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

LEVERAGING THE ARMY VISION TO AMEND THE COMBAT EXCLUSION LAW

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ABSTRACT

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War is an ugly instrument of peace, but sometimes inevitable. Therefore, the military is structured, resourced, and directed to execute that mission should the government deem it necessary, and hopefully as a last resort. The current War on Terrorism provides an opportunity to examine the military in a unique way and evaluate its sufficiency in meeting the needs of commanders in conflict. It is an ideal time to explore the relevance of the combat exclusion rule. This is not a gender issue, although some would make it so, but instead an issue of combat capability. More than any other time, the issue of women in combat has become an important aspect of the nation's ability to execute war. Based on the Army vision statement the re-evaluation of this rule is critical. It is imperative that strategic leaders in the Army leverage the momentum of the current war to illustrate the need to amend this outdated rule, while considering its original intent and the concerns of Congress. It is not only a matter of principle, but more importantly, it is a matter of combat capability, flexibility, and effectiveness.

LEVERAGING THE ARMY VISION TO AMEND THE COMBAT EXCLUSION LAW

War is an ugly instrument of peace, but sometimes inevitable. Therefore, the military is structured, resourced, and directed to execute that mission should the government deem it necessary, and hopefully as a last resort. The current War on Terrorism provides an opportunity to examine the military in a unique way and evaluate its sufficiency in meeting the needs of commanders during conflict. It is an ideal time to explore Department of Defense and Army policy as it relates to women in combat since there are significant implications in the current operational environment. This is not a gender issue, although some would make it so, but instead an issue of combat capability. War is not a venue for social experimentation, but in an effort to meet requirements, the Army must embrace the social dynamics that present themselves. More than any other time, the issue of women in combat has become an important aspect of the nation's ability to execute war. Based on the Army vision statement issued by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army, the re-evaluation of this rule is critical. It is imperative that strategic leaders in the Army leverage the momentum of the current war to illustrate the need to amend this outdated policy and law, while taking into consideration its original intent and the concerns of Congress. To ensure relevance and combat effectiveness, a re-examination based on an evolving and dynamic asymmetric battlespace is essential. The impact on the new modular force is equally important. It is not only a matter of principle, but more importantly, it is a matter of combat capability, flexibility, and effectiveness.

When reviewing the exclusion law, it is important to note the historical context in which it was written and its intent. In doing so, one develops a better understanding of the issue and its relationship to the current conditions and characteristics of war. It is entirely possible the characteristics of war have changed enough over time to prevent it from being relevant at all, in which case, a complete rewrite or elimination would be necessary. A brief discussion of the current battlespace environment provides the proper context for an examination of the original intent and its relevance today. Any amendment that might be necessary will lend itself to a discussion of strategic leadership as a means for accomplishing a change to the policy and law. Therefore, three requirements arise: examination of the original intent and its relevance today, evaluation of the Army vision and strategy, and a discussion on the role of Army leadership to lead needed changes.

Historical Context

Examination of this issue requires consideration of the historical context. It is appropriate; therefore, to provide some background on the topic. For the Army, it began with the Women's

Army Corps, formed under the auspices that women would not be included in combat operations. Throughout the 1970s, multiple changes to women's positions initiated momentum for reviewing the role of military women. As more positions became available to women, the issue of their proximity to danger became a debate. In 1988, the Department of Defense initiated a policy referred to as the "risk rule."¹ This new policy specified that the Department of Defense would not approve positions that place women where they would be at risk to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture. Each service coded positions accordingly.

By 1992, the Army had initiated its own policy.² The first major changes took effect in the Air Force and Navy when the National Defense Act of 1993 made accommodations for women to serve in previously closed jobs. In addition, the President initiated a Presidential commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to explore the combat exclusion laws.³ After a long review and extensive report on the topic, the commission maintained that the Armed Forces should not assign women to combat.⁴ That same year, Secretary of Defense Aspin released a memo reasserting the continued restriction of women in combat units below the brigade level but opened ships and combat aircraft to women who met the qualifications. Congress repealed this and added a requirement for the Department of Defense to notify them before making any additional changes (that requirement remains today).⁵ Secretary Aspin initiated an implementation Committee (with representation from all the services) to review the "risk rule."

In January of 1994, at the recommendation of the implementation committee, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the policy based on risk.⁶ A key contributing factor to the change in policy was the role women played during Desert Storm. The old policy became irrelevant based on the extensive roles women played during that conflict. Additionally, battlefield dynamics continued to evolve and a more asymmetrical approach to warfare proved essential. The military showed flexibility and agility towards its policy and demonstrated the ability to adapt to changes dictated by the battlefield, which closely reflects the current debate on this topic and could serve as a model for current efforts to update policy. The "risk rule" was replaced by a "direct combat assignment rule" that allowed all service members to compete for all positions except those in "units below the brigade level whose primary mission is direct ground combat."⁷ The Secretary specified that no service would close positions that were formerly open to women. He also defined the term "ground combat" and expanded the authority of the services to close positions to women if "the units and positions are required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units."⁸ The definition of direct combat mirrored what was already in the 1992 Army policy:

Engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver or shock effect.⁹

The National Defense Act for 1994 established guidelines for the integration of women and specifically stated that the Secretary of Defense would inform Congress of changes (within 90 days) to the remaining policy that restricts women to units “whose mission requires routine engagement in ground combat.”¹⁰ In addition, it required an advance notification of 30 days before the opening of new positions to women that were formerly restricted. The authorization act dictates that the Secretary of Defense has the authority to decide where women should best serve but that he must inform Congress before changing existing policy. Because the definition of “direct combat” is exclusive as specified in the authorization act, and because the authorization act becomes public law, most refer to it as the “combat exclusion law.”

In 1997, Congress requested the Secretary of Defense study the implications of the legislative and policy changes established in the early 1990s. In compliance with this request, the Department of Defense contracted the RAND Company to conduct several studies. These studies validated that 91% of positions existed for women and that appropriate integration had taken place. According to the RAND report, up to 80% of all military positions were open to women and the integration process did not degrade readiness or unit cohesion.¹¹ When asked about the combat exclusion law, 80% of women surveyed said they thought it should be relaxed. When asked the same question, half of the enlisted men agreed and about a third of the officers agreed.¹² Congress requested a follow up review by the Government Accounting Office in 1998, which reported that 15% of all positions in the military were closed to women. Of the positions closed, 46% were direct combat jobs, 41% were due to collocation, 12% were a result of living arrangements (Navy only), and 2% were special operations. Of particular importance was the finding that the Department of Defense definition of direct combat forces being “well forward” on the battlefield “might be problematic and the definition may become increasingly less descriptive of actual battlefield conditions.”¹³

What Has Changed

In assessing the strategic landscape of 2006, it is clear that battlefield dynamics and operational environment have changed; however, the 2006 Defense Authorization Act and Department of Defense policy have not. The language on this topic used in the 2006 Defense Authorization act is exactly as it was in 1994.¹⁴ The Army policy on the assignment of women

has not changed since 1992.¹⁵ What has changed substantially is the asymmetric way of warfare, the dispersed transnational enemy, the new modular Army,¹⁶ and society's growing acceptance of women and their current role as it pertains to combat. These changes should drive reflection on the current operating environment both in Washington D.C. and on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. It is interesting to note that the Army leadership made a decision to restructure during a time of war. This speaks to the criticality of current requirements presented by the modern battlefield.

The Army's tenacity in transforming so quickly represented the full commitment of the leadership. The current Army policy bars women from being assigned to combat units below brigade level thus preventing the newly formed Forward Support Company (FSC), which is coed, from being assigned to the maneuver battalion (task organized with infantry, armor, and engineers) that it was designed to support. Prior to transforming to the modular force, this was not a problem. The maneuver unit had the organic support needed to sustain itself and would replenish by using combat trains (resupply convoys) to return to the Brigade Support Area, normally located in the brigade rear area and lead by the support battalion commander. In the modular redesign, all support assets (formally the organic support of the combat unit plus direct support assets provided by the forward support battalion) were consolidated in the FSC, which supports by moving forward into the maneuver battalion battlespace but is not assigned to that commander. A further discussion of the Army FSC will illustrate the negative impact of this outdated policy on the organizations ability to transform.

The intent of the modular design was to task organize the maneuver unit so that it could train as a unit prior to going to war. The initial intent was to assign the FSC to the maneuver unit as part of task force but the combat exclusion law prevented it. The impact to the task force is a reduction in the maneuver commander's flexibility within his battlespace and inhibits unit cohesion as a task force. Where the FSC locates on the battlefield does not change based on who it is assigned to. The FSC must still go into the maneuver battalion battlespace to resupply and maintain equipment whether assigned to either the support battalion (non-direct combat unit) or the maneuver battalion (direct combat unit). The redesigned task force has requirements for combat, combat support, and combat service support missions in order to be a "plug and play" type unit. Commanders of these battalions are trained to manage all three in different roles within the battlespace. The implications of not assigning the FSC to the maneuver unit are significant. It is most evident in the areas of command and control, and unit cohesion. The maneuver commander lacks command responsibility over a vital part of the task force, especially with regard to non-judicial actions and evaluations. The soldiers feel the

pressure of having two commanders (one formal and one informal) and two standard operating procedures. This creates confusion, a lack of identity and cohesion, and risk to the unit.

Commanders on the ground are doing their best to minimize risk but it requires additional energy and direction that they should not have to expend to accommodate a policy that is irrelevant to the current battle environment. Several questions challenge our military leaders and Congress on this topic. Why didn't the issue of women and their location on the battlefield come up during the redesign? One might submit that transforming during a time of war necessitated a focus on fighting in the most effective way possible. Gender integration is so prolific now that the idea of fighting a war without women collocating in the combat zone was not sustainable. Do resources constrain the Army's ability to support the "combat exclusion law" as written? The Army needs every warrior available for rotation into the combat zone when it is fighting on several battlefields at once. Based on challenging retention and recruiting goals this is not a time to turn those away who are willing to contribute in this way.

One viewpoint to consider is the assignment of the FSC to the maneuver unit but code it only for males. The first concern with this proposal is that positions formerly open to women cannot be later closed to them according to Department of Defense policy.¹⁷ Women formerly filled the direct support and transportation positions that now make up a large part of the FSC. When organic support positions in the old combat battalions and direct support positions in forward support battalions were consolidated to streamline logistics on the battlefield these positions were merged into the new FSC. The second concern is that approximately 22,000 positions that are currently open to women would have to be coded for men only, which would significantly affect recruiting and retention. The bottom line is that there are insufficient numbers of men coming into the Army to sustain that nor is it necessary since women performing these jobs are performing well and continue to receive accolades from Army leadership. The third concern is that it hampers the professional growth of women logisticians who need the experience in order to make sound, informed decisions later in their careers when they become forward support battalion commanders.

Since the Army reorganized the support structure to reflect the battlespace requirements and women are proving essential in these roles, it would be counterproductive to revert to an all male unit. Serving in this capacity, these women are not participating in patrols, conducting raids or offensive combat operations, but they are located in combat zones. The maneuver commander has the ability to divert their activities away from actual offensive combat operations in order to stay within the intent of the law. However, this requires that the Army and Department of Defense review the current definition of direct combat and untie the reference to

location. This issue of semantics could allow for a compromise in the law if the Army appropriately addresses this with the Secretary of Defense and presents it to Congress.

The current definition of direct combat published by the Department of Defense is outdated and its reference to location on the battlefield virtually places anyone in the theater of operations in a direct combat zone. The fact that all soldiers who enter the theater of operation are then authorized combat recognition further contributes to the perception that the threat is not tied to just certain forward areas. The use of “well forward on the battlefield” must be changed to meet current conditions. A 1998 GAO report noted this prominently in their report to Congress on gender issues.¹⁸ However, subsequent Defense Authorization Acts made no changes nor did the Department of Defense adjust definitions accordingly. In the case of Iraq, the country has been divided up into zones that on any given day might be classified as green (stable) or red (unstable). In addition, within those zones, there might be certain areas of resistance. Additionally, the current joint service doctrine indicates clearly that phases of stability operations and combat will in fact overlap. It is therefore more appropriate to just change the policy to reflect the current characteristics of war and if the military, Congress, and the American people are not ready for women in offensive roles to adjust the policy to reflect their defensive role and eliminate all references to locations.

It is not prudent to assume the methodologies used in the early 1990s remain relevant today. Society as a whole has changed its view and acceptance of women in the military. The mobilization of the reserve component results in much of society knowing or being related to women veterans. Although there have been approximately 75 women fatalities from the current war, there has not been public outcry that women specifically are being killed. The outcry from society centers on support to soldiers. There has been no media frenzy about women serving in their current roles. Even in the case of Private Jessica Lynch (who was taken as a Prisoner of War), the focus of lessons learned was about the readiness of logistics unit to response to mission requirements not about readiness of women to respond. It was this validation that all soldiers are in the combat zone when in the theater of operations that prompted a strategic communications campaign that espoused the Warrior ethos and newly rewritten Soldiers creed. The ethos and creed emphasize that every soldier is a warrior first and a technician second. The Chief of Staff of the Army increased the requirements for marksmanship and the Army, at all levels, and acknowledged that there is no safe place on the battlefield. In fact, the number one killer of soldiers in this war has been Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the logisticians have been the most susceptible to these. Maintaining a policy based on location is simply irrelevant and minimizes the role of women as part of the total force.

While the Army and military in general are evolving and adapting to the enemy, Congress has been slow in its adjustment. Certain congressional members who have worked this issue over time have continued to introduce legislature that would restrict women from these FSCs. In discussing this issue with one of the most prominent members leading this effort (in a non-attribution setting), it became clear that he did not understand the specific nature of adjusting the current policies. It was his position that women should not go on raids and that the location of women in close proximity to direct combat units would result in privacy and facility issues between the genders. His opinions seemed largely based on research completed in the 1990s as opposed to more current research. His argument was in alignment with the sentiment of that decade and mirrored the Army's position at that time. His thinking has not adapted to the current operating environment and he was unable to separate the issue of collocation and FSCs from the issues that he worked on in the past. Congressional members serving on Capital Hill for extended periods continue to weigh in on this issue knowing that the Army is determined to make adjustments. Transforming congressional members personally tied to the original policies becomes paramount in the Army's effort to stay relevant. Regretfully, it only takes one congressional member to introduce legislature prohibiting women at the right time to stall needed changes.

The 1998 GAO report stated that one of the reasons the Army had not changed its policy to that point was that they did not feel they had the support of the Congress, even though there are no statutory requirements prohibiting women from being collocated. The only existing requirement is for the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress within 90 days of the Army changing its policy. In a non-attribution setting, a very senior member of the Army stated that any informal indications that the military was considering a change in the policy prompted certain Congressional members to introduce legislature completely restricting women. This informal threat came at a time when the Army needed to make adjustments but could not afford to risk the FSCs being coded as male only. The Army found itself in a stalemate with several congressional members. Since the Army is unable to lobby for itself, it is at a disadvantage when it comes to political issues. Assuming that the Army would like the FSCs to be coed and assigned to the maneuver units, the very political "dance" is so tedious that it dissuades an Army that is otherwise focused on fighting a war from entering a political competition against professional politicians. However, it is precisely this war that offers the leverage to readdress this topic with Congress and sufficient attention should be spent by the Army leadership to understand how best to persuade Congress that this is a combat capability issue not a gender issue.

The congressional member referenced earlier was overly concerned about the living arrangements of a FSC within the maneuver unit. However, the FSC is already living in a coed environment and solid leadership has quickly overcome living space challenges. The culture of the Army has evolved to the point that leaders do not have to spend much time on this, as service members are accustomed to working out suitable solutions at the lowest levels. They have the same challenge whether they are assigned to the support battalion (as they currently are) or whether they are assigned to the maneuver unit. A tent is a tent, separate latrines and areas provided for privacy are an issue regardless of where the unit is located, or whom they are assigned to.

As a case study, I would like to present the unit I commanded in Korea. I started as a Forward Support Battalion with three companies and contact teams (which included women) that I attached to the infantry and armor battalions. After my first year in command we transformed to the Brigade Support Battalion which consisted of four base companies (direct and reinforcing support) and four FSCs (formally the organic support that resided in the combat units plus direct support augmentation – in other words a mini logistics task force organized to support the maneuver units). Initially, I attached the FSCs to the maneuver units and they collocated with those units, worked out of their motor pools, and went to the field with them. At first, the maneuver commanders (who now had infantry, armor, and engineers task organized to them) were apprehensive about women in their barracks, even though logistical units have been using coed barracks for the last 20 years. After several months of adjustment, the maneuver commanders found that they preferred having their logistics unit collocated where they could include them in the team events and mission requirements. In fact, they decided to include them in everything and make them completely part of the task force, to include issuing them the maneuver unit crest and including the FSC on their unit coins and flags. This instilled team spirit and unit cohesion.

The unit described above transformed two years early and predated the debate in Congress on assignment or attachment of the FSCs. Once the debate became public, it was clear we might have been overzealous in our initial efforts. Although we were within the scope of the law, we were concerned that it might be perceived as a conflict, as it pertained to collocation, so we pulled the FSCs back to the Support Battalion and they worked directly for the Support commander and not the maneuver unit they supported. The maneuver commanders were disappointed in their loss of combat capability and the ability to integrate the support into their units as they determined. I now had eight companies, four of which still had to operate in the maneuver unit battlespace. As the support battalion commander, I gained

responsibility all the way into the maneuver companies' area of operations using units that I could not routinely collocate. This was a true struggle for the FSC commanders who had to formally adhere to the support battalion standard operating procedures yet informally adhere to the maneuver unit's standard operating procedure in order to operate safely within their battlespace.

Leveraging the Army Vision to Lead Change

The historical context, dynamic legislative process, and policy semantics of this important issue leads to a reflection on strategic leadership. Army leadership best documents the strategic direction in the Army vision and strategy statements that are incorporated into the Army Game Plan. The word that resonates loudest, throughout the Army vision and its game plan, is the word "relevant." Specifically, it states that the Army must be the preeminent land force that is relevant to the challenges of the 21st century.¹⁹ It stresses that all soldiers are warriors first and must be ready for combat. It directs streamlining of "like" activities similar to the formation of the FSCs, enabling forces to be more effective and efficient. It also stressed the importance of belonging to a group to build and maintain readiness and cohesion while reducing uncertainty.²⁰ The plan relays that "The progress that we make over the next 12 to 18 months will determine our ability to continue to accomplish our mission and to position ourselves properly for the 21st century."²¹ This demonstrates that Army leadership is engaged and committed to our force and has provided the direction needed to pursue changes necessary to fulfill the vision. As stated, the next 12 to 18 months are critical. Leading change is a tedious and complex role but the current environment has all the conditions necessary support changes now.

To lead change a leader must consider a model to help navigate through the inevitable challenges. One of the most noteworthy writers on leading change is John P. Kotter, who proposes an eight-stage process for creating change.²² The eight stages are:

1. Urgency
2. Creating the Guiding Coalition
3. Developing a vision and strategy
4. Communicating the change
5. Empowering broad based action
6. Generating short term wins
7. Consolidating gains and produce more change
8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture

In reviewing the eight stages, it is evident that many of the conditions for successful change either currently exists or the Army leadership has already begun addressing them. The current conditions indicate an overall readiness for amending the definitions, policies, and law.

The first stage is *urgency*. Urgency lends momentum that is hard to generate otherwise. In this case, war provides the sense of urgency needed for this type of strategic change, especially the kind that incorporates societal norms and if not acted upon during this time of need then the momentum is lost and an opportunity sacrificed. The public will rally to the compelling argument that women are already serving in combat zones but only in a defensive manner.

The second stage is *creating the guiding coalition*. In this case, the guiding coalition has already been formulated. Issues from money (supplemental) to the codes of conduct have led the Army to work closely with congress and other interest groups to work through these issues. The relationship with these other groups tends to be more remote during a time of peace. The third stage is *developing a vision and strategy*. Of all the stages, this appears to be the most challenging. This takes mental focus and direction by the top strategic leader and, in the case of the Army the 2006 Vision Statement and strategy, incorporates the uncertain environment the military currently faces. It specifically addresses the need to be relevant to the challenges of the complex security environment.

Communicating the change is the fourth stage. This is becoming more apparent in the increasing number of articles about female veterans. Stories of mothers, sisters, and wives serving in the war are evenly represented, with little to no outcry from society on the topic. In fact, perhaps society is the one communicating, albeit passively, the need for change. The fifth stage is *empowering broad based action*. This empowers subordinates to take risk in order to remove obstacles. The modular force itself is evidence that the leadership was willing to take broad based action. The current environment demands a new way to fight and win the nations wars. The broadest based action may, in fact be modifying the combat exclusion rule.

Generating short term wins is the sixth stage. There is no movement to change the entire intent of the rule as there is no real initiative to enroll women in armor or infantry branches in the immediate future. However, slightly modifying the rule in order to simply assign units more effectively and provide more command and control seems a reasonable short-term solution in an overall campaign to recognize the benefits as well as the contributions of women in the military services.

The final two stages are more substantive. The seventh is to *consolidate gains and produce more change* and the eighth is *anchoring new approaches in the culture*. Both of these

stages require strategic leaders who possess the endurance to take change full circle in order to feed future change. An effective information campaign is required to illustrate how the change was successful, contributed to the overall success of the organization, and in this case reduced some of the fog of war. This is difficult to accomplish in the Army, and the US as a whole, as the focus of its citizens is often instant on gratification. There is only so much that can be accomplished in a 2-4 year assignment. The current war on terrorism provides the right catalyst for achieving change in a short-term environment.

The Way Ahead

The Army must persuade the Secretary of Defense to modify the existing policy pertaining to women in combat and inform Congress, in adherence with public law, to accommodate co-location with combat units. This allows the Army to adjust policy accordingly and assign FSCs to the maneuver battalions; thereby, meeting the intent and compelling needs of the “modular redesign.” These modifications will best meet the requirements of the modern operational environment.

Resistance from Congress will most likely center on a lack of understanding of the issue. Leadership must stress that the military is not asking to change the current combat exclusion law to allow women participation in offensive combat operations but only to adjust the rule to accommodate the demands of today’s operational battlespace. The adjustment could be as simple as eliminating reference to location. Women are currently serving in combat zones (in a defensive and supporting role) successfully and without any criticism from the force or society. It is important to note, this is not technically violating the written policy; however, the current battlefield conditions limit actions within the spirit of the policy, which is why policy and definitions need updating immediately. This will be a sensitive discussion with Congress but military leadership should argue that they are responding to requirements of the current operational environment and policies should accurately represent it.

Congress may also argue that society is not ready for women in combat. Assuming that is true, the Army should address it from an “offensive combat role” standpoint. Women have already become casualties while performing their jobs on the battlefield. This has not caused a media frenzy nor generated a public discourse that women should not be serving in combat zones. Current outcry exists because of casualties in general, but women have not been singled out. The key to this argument remains better definition of offensive versus defensive roles.

The global war on terrorism provides the sense of urgency, momentum, and environment for change. Society and the Army need to become part of the socialization process because the environment dictates it. The Army must capitalize on the current conditions and propel the Department of the Army and Congress through this time of needed change in the spirit of the Army vision. A former CIA director stated in a private speech in late 2006, "Rules are sometimes left in place too long without review and become irrelevant, becoming constraining without good reason." The combat exclusion law is an example of one such rule. Our great leaders must leverage the opportunity presented by the current environment to refine existing definitions and modify the combat exclusion policies and law. This will enable subordinate leaders to execute the intent of the Army vision and strategy while meeting the demands of the Global War on Terrorism.

End Notes

¹ U.S. General Accounting Office. *Gender Issues: Information on DOD's Assignment Policy and Direct Combat Definition: Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998). 2.

² U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers. Army Regulation 600-13* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 27 March 1992).

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⁴ U.S. Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. *Women in Combat: Report to the President* (Washington, D.C.: November 1992). 48.

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⁶ Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense, "*Subject: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.*" Memorandum for Secretaries of the military Departments (Washington D.C.: 13 January, 1994).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1994 (P.L. 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993).

¹¹ RAND. *New Opportunities for Military Women, Effects upon Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).

¹² RAND. *Military Readiness: Women are not the Problem*. RAND Research Brief (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).

¹³ U.S. General Accounting Office. *Gender Issues: Information on DOD's Assignment Policy and Direct Combat Definition: Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998). 4.

¹⁴ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2006 (P.L. 109-89, May 20, 2006).

¹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army. *Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers*. *Army Regulation 600-13* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 27 March 1992).

¹⁶ The Honorable Francis J. Harvey and General Peter J. Schoomaker, *A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, Fiscal year 2007*, Posture Statement presented to the 110th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007).

¹⁷ Secretary of Defense, *Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule* (Washington D.C.: Memorandum, January 13, 1994).

¹⁸ U.S. General Accounting Office. *Gender Issues: Information on DOD's Assignment Policy and Direct Combat Definition: Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1998). 5.

¹⁹ *2006 Army Game Plan*, available from [http://www.army.mil/features/2006 Army Game Plan](http://www.army.mil/features/2006%20Army%20Game%20Plan).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² John p. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

